Allison Eid On Abortion
Eid Sought To Take Up A Case That Could Have Allowed Anti-Abortion Protesters To Utilize Graphic Images
Eid Wanted To Take Up A Case To Potentially Allow Anti-Abortion Protesters To Utilize Graphic Images In Their Protests
While On The Colorado Supreme Court, Eid Wanted To Take Up A Case That Could Have Overturned A Ruling That Restricted Anti-Choice Protesters From Utilizing Graphic Images In Protests. According to the Alliance For Justice, “Allison Eid (Tenth Circuit), while on the Colorado Supreme Court, twice dissented from the denial of a writ of certiorari in a case involving graphic images of aborted fetuses displayed by protesters during church services. Applying strict scrutiny based on the compelling interest of protecting children from disturbing images, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld an injunction preventing such displays.” [Alliance For Justice, accessed 5/15/24]
Eid’s Urging To Take Up The Case Made Anti-Abortion Groups Believe She Opposed Abortion
Eid’s Urging To Take Up Case Involving Graphic Anti-Abortion Images Led Anti-Choice Groups To Conclude That She Opposed Abortion. According to Politico, “Eid unsuccessfully urged her colleagues on the Colorado Supreme Court to take up a legal case involving an injunction against the display of graphic images by anti-abortion protesters. Some anti-abortion groups have taken her stance as a sign that she opposes abortion.” [Politico, 6/29/18]
Allison Eid On Education
Eid Opposed Accessible And Safe Education
2015: Eid Dissented From A Court Decision That Struck Down A Program Allowing Discrimination On The Basis Of Disability
2015: The Colorado Supreme Court Struck Down Douglas County School District’s Choice Scholarship Program
2015: The Colorado Supreme Court Struck Down Douglas County School District’s Choice Scholarship Program, Which Channeled Public Funds To Religious Schools. According to the Washington Post. “The Colorado Supreme Court struck down a voucher program in the state’s third-largest school district Monday, finding the program unconstitutional because it channels public funds to religious schools. The divided ruling reversed a decision by a state appeals court and means that the Douglas County School District will not be able to administer its Choice Scholarship Pilot Program, which allowed families to use taxpayer dollars to pay for private school.” [Washington Post, 6/29/15]
- The Choice Scholarship Program Permitted “Private School Partners” To Discriminate Against Students With Disabilities. According to Justice Márquez’s Concurrence of the Colorado Supreme Court Decision in “Taxpayers For Public Education v. Douglas County School District,” “The Private School Partners are plainly not public schools, and the trial court found that fourteen of the twenty-three Private School Partners are located outside the Douglas County School District. Sixteen are sectarian or religious and teach ‘sectarian tenets or doctrines’ as this term is used in article IX, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution. At least eight discriminate in enrollment or admissions on the basis of religious beliefs or practices. In addition, the trial court found that the CSP permits Private School Partners to discriminate against students with disabilities; that one school has an ‘AIDS policy’ under which it can refuse to admit, or expel, HIV-positive students; and that another participating school lists homosexuality as a ‘cause for termination’ in its teacher contract. Finally, every single one of the CSP’s Private School Partners charges tuition.” [2015 CO 50, “Taxpayers For Public Education v. Douglas County School District,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 13SC233, Filed 6/29/15]
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion, Claiming Allegations Of Anti-Catholic Aminus. According to Justice Eid’s Dissent of the Colorado Supreme Court Decision in “Taxpayers For Public Education v. Douglas County School District,” “In the end, the plurality’s head-in-the-sand approach is a disservice to Colorado, as it allows allegations of anti-Catholicf animus to linger unaddressed. The plurality should squarely address the issue of whether section 7 is enforceable, as this court has done with other provisions of the Colorado Constitution. See, e.g., Colo. Educ. Assoc. v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65, 79 (Colo. 2008) (interpreting article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution as enforced against labor organizations consistently with First Amendment jurisprudence). Because the plurality fails to do so, and because it misinterprets the text of section 7 and ignores relevant Establishment Clause jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent from its opinion.” [2015 CO 50, “Taxpayers For Public Education v. Douglas County School District,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 13SC233, Filed 6/29/15]
The U.S. Supreme Court Remanded The Case, But The Program Was Rescinded And The Case Was Dismissed
The U.S. Supreme Court Remanded The Case For Reconsideration In Light “Trinity Lutheran Church Of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,” But The School District Rescinded The Program And The Case Was Dismissed. According to the University Of Colorado Law Review, “The Colorado Supreme Court in 2015 ruled that the Choice Scholarship Program indeed violated Article IX, § 7. In 2017, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its recent opinion in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer. But prior to the rehearing, the Douglas County School District Board of Education rescinded the Choice Scholarship Program, and the case was dismissed as moot. In an instant, the effect of years of litigation completely vanished. [University Of Colorado Law Review, Accessed 6/26/24]
Eid Was Hostile To Public Education Funding
2015: Eid Joined A Majority Opinion Hostile To A Challenge To Colorado’s Education Funding System
Amendment 23 Directed The Colorado To Spend More Money On K-12 Education. According to the Colorado Sun, “In 2000, Colorado voters passed a constitutional amendment directing the state to spend more money on K-12 education. Known as Amendment 23, the measure did a few things, but the most significant was requiring the state to increase base per-pupil school funding by at least the rate of inflation each year. For the first 10 years, per-pupil funding also increased by an additional 1% on top of that.” [Colorado Sun, 1/27/21]
Colorado Lawmakers Crafted A Workaround Called The “Negative Factor,” Which Allowed Them To Skirt Fully Funding Education. According to the Colorado Sun, “That year, however, with the state’s budget in the throes of a financial crisis inflicted by the Great Recession, state lawmakers decided they could no longer afford to keep up with the growing cost of education. Facing steep budget cuts, lawmakers rescinded $130 million owed to schools during the 2009-10 fiscal year. A year later, they created the inscrutable budget writing device known as the ‘negative factor,’ providing a legal mechanism to cut education funding without running afoul of Amendment 23. The ‘negative factor’ refers to the amount that state budget writers are falling short of school finance requirements each year. It was later renamed the budget stabilization factor because lawmakers thought the original name had, well, a negative connotation.” [Colorado Sun, 1/27/21]
2015: Eid Joined Colleagues In The Colorado Supreme Court Ruling That Upheld The “Negative Factor”
The Colorado Supreme Court Ruled To Uphold The “Negative Factor” And Its Use. According to the Colorado Sun, “In Dwyer v. State of Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court in 2015 ruled that the negative factor is allowed under the state constitution. But the narrow 4-3 decision shows how controversial the budget maneuver was. The court’s decision hinged on the distinction between base per-pupil funding and total program funding, which includes the additional factors within the School Finance Act, like educating at-risk children or those with special needs. Lawmakers argued that Amendment 23 only required the statewide base funding to increase by inflation each year, not the districts’ total program funding. The court agreed, ruling that the negative factor is legal as long as it comes out of the additional money districts receive for those other factors.” [Colorado Sun, 1/27/21]
2015: Eid Joined The Narrow Majority Opinion. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Dwyer v. State of Colorado,” “Plaintiffs allege that the State has improperly reduced statewide base per pupil funding in violation of Amendment 23. In so doing, they confuse ‘base’ with ‘total.’ Interpreting the term ‘statewide base per pupil funding’ according to its plain and statutorily defined meaning, we hold that the negative factor has not reduced the base below its constitutional minimum and thus does not violate Amendment 23. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. Accordingly, we make our rule absolute, and we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint.” [2015 CO 58, “Dwyer v. State of Colorado,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 15SA22, Filed 9/21/15]
2009: Eid Was The Lone Dissenter In A Case Involving Public School Funding
The Colorado Supreme Court Ruled To Uphold Locally Raised Revenue To Address Public School Funding
The Colorado Supreme Court Ruled To Uphold Locally Raised Revenue To Address Public School Funding. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Mesa County Board Of County Commissioners v. State of Colorado,” “We conclude that SB 07-199 was a constitutional application of article X, section 20 to the School Finance Act. The plaintiffs failed to prove it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsection (4)(a) does not require a second election for legislation directing a local school district to use funds received as a result of a valid waiver election under subsection (7). Article X, section 20 does not expressly address the situation raised by the dual funding nature of the School Finance Act except to prohibit local school districts from refusing to pay their mandated share of funding. The school districts remained the relevant taxing authority for purposes of the locally raised revenue, and a statewide vote is not required to waive a revenue limit at the local level. […] We find that there is ample evidence and authority to find SB 07-199 constitutional, and conclude that the plaintiffs failed to show it violated a constitutional provision. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with directions to enter judgment for the defendants.” [203 P.3d 519 (2009), “Mesa County Board Of County Commissioners v. State of Colorado,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 08SA216, Filed 3/16/09]
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion
2009: Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion. According to Justice Eid’s Dissent of the Colorado Supreme Court Decision in “Mesa County Board Of County Commissioners v. State of Colorado,” “Justice EID, dissenting. Today the majority holds that SB 07-199 — which in effect authorizes a $117 million tax increase on Colorado taxpayers — complies with article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution, even though the voters never approved it. The majority’s rationale for its decision — namely, that SB 07-199 is simply not covered by article X, section 20 — is, in my view, utterly unconvincing. In order to reach this result, the majority discovers that a gaping hole exists in article X, section 20 — a hole so big that, according to the majority, SB 07-199 falls right through it. […] There has never been (and under the majority’s opinion today, never will be) a vote of the people authorizing this change in state tax policy. Because the majority deprives the people of their right to vote on SB 07-199 and the $117 million tax increase it permits, I must respectfully dissent from its opinion.” [203 P.3d 519 (2009), “Mesa County Board Of County Commissioners v. State of Colorado,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 08SA216, Filed 3/16/09]
Eid Joined A Dissent Against Allowing A Group Of Parents To Challenge Colorado’s School Funding System
The Colorado Supreme Court Ruled To Allow A Group Of Parents To Challenge The State’s School Funding System As Contrary To The Colorado Constitution. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Lobato v. State of Colorado,” “Accordingly, the plaintiffs must be provided the opportunity to prove their allegations. To be successful, they must prove that the state’s current public school financing system is not rationally related to the General Assembly’s constitutional mandate to provide a “thorough and uniform” system of public education.” [218 P.3d 358 (2009)), “Lobato v. State of Colorado,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 08SC185, Filed 10/19/09]
Eid Joined A Dissent Against Allowing A Group Of Parents To Challenge The State’s School Funding System As Contrary To The Colorado Constitution. According to the Dissent of the Colorado Supreme Court Decision in “Lobato v. State of Colorado,” “‘Constitutions must necessarily be interpreted to meet the needs of changing times, but the critical, constitutionally-prescribed boundary separating the executive and legislative powers must remain constant.’ Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1378. I would hold today that this court should apply this unquestionably prudent logic to the judiciary as well, reinforcing the boundaries between all three branches of government. Education funding in this state may represent a crisis demanding resolution, but that resolution must take place within the constitutionally-prescribed forum as the inherent policy determinations in such a remedy lie outside the scope of this court. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding justiciability. I am authorized to state that Justice COATS and Justice EID join in this dissent.” [218 P.3d 358 (2009)), “Lobato v. State of Colorado,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 08SC185, Filed 10/19/09]
Eid Assisted Opposition Against Granting In-State Tuition Status To Undocumented Immigrants
As Colorado Solicitor General, Eid Assisted In Preparing A Formal Opinion For The Attorney General Concluding That Colorado Could Not Grant In-State Tuition Status To Undocumented Immigrants. According to the Colorado Department Of Law, “In sum, federal law requires that, in order for states to grant in-state tuition status to undocumented aliens, they must first affirmatively provide for such eligibility, and do so on a residency-neutral basis. Currently, state law provides in-state tuition status based on residency. Several bills have been introduced in the General Assembly that would eliminate residency classification and determine in-state tuition status based on residency-neutral criteria, but none has passed. The question posed by CCHE is whether it has the authority to make such a change, by policy or regulation. As set forth above, CCHE’s authority under the Tuition Classification Act is quite limited, and does not encompass authority to change the criteria by which in-state tuition status is granted. For this reason, I conclude that CCHE lacks statutory authority to establish a policy or regulation granting in-state tuition status to undocumented aliens. Rather, such a determination would require an amendment to the Tuition Classification Act by the General Assembly.” [Colorado Department Of Law, 1/23/06]
Eid Was Named On The Brief. According to the Colorado Department of Law, [Colorado Department Of Law, 1/23/06]
Allison Eid On Democracy
Eid Opposed A Court-Imposed Redistricting Plan
2012: Eid Dissented From A Court Decision That Upheld A Redistricting Map In Colorado
2012: The Colorado Supreme Court Upheld A Court-Imposed Redistricting Plan
2012: The Colorado Supreme Court Upheld A Court-Imposed Redistricting Plan, Saying It Provided “Fair And Effective Representation For All Citizens.” According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Hall v. Moreno,” “The trial court reasonably balanced the many competing non-constitutional factors in a manner that will maximize ‘fair and effective representation for all citizens.’ Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565, 84 S.Ct. 1362. Its findings are supported by the record, which was compiled through a thorough, open, and fair process. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly applied the controlling law and adopted a lawful redistricting scheme.” [2012 CO 14, “Hall v. Moreno,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 11SC842, Filed 2/27/12]
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion, Emphasizing Preservation Of Existing District Lines. According to Justice Eid’s Dissent of the Colorado Supreme Court Decision in “Hall v. Moreno,” “In my view, the district court abused its discretion by failing to give adequate weight to ‘the minimization of disruption of prior district lines,’ contrary to section 2-1-102(1)(b)(IV), C.R.S. (2011). Because the majority similarly disregards this factor, I respectfully dissent.” [2012 CO 14, “Hall v. Moreno,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 11SC842, Filed 2/27/12]
Republican-Aligned Lawyers Argued Similarly To Eid
Republican-Aligned Lawyers Argued Similarly To Eid, Highlighting Importance Of Preserving Existing District Lines. According to the Denver Post, “In a decision posted Monday, the Colorado Supreme Court says that a lower court was right in selecting a map that made many districts more competitive between Democrats and Republicans. Lawyers aligned with the GOP had argued that it was more important to preserve existing congressional boundaries. Republicans currently hold a 4-3 majority in the U.S. House delegation.” [Denver Post, 2/27/12]
Allison Eid On Unions
Eid Dissented Against Unions
Eid Argued To Restrict Unions’ Communication Efforts
The Colorado Supreme Court Held That Teachers’ Union Staff Communications Did Not Violate Colorado’s Ban On Unions Making Campaign Contributions And Expenditures. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Colorado Education Association v. Rutt,” “We hold that the membership communication exception to expenditures must be construed broadly to reflect the plain language of this constitutional provision and to satisfy the demands of the First Amendment. We also hold that the membership communication exception as construed applies to most of the unions’ activities in this case. To the extent that the challenged union activities are not embraced by this membership communication exception — creating postcards intended to be sent to nonmembers, and sending letters and making phone calls to nonmembers to recruit nonmembers for the walks supporting Bacon — we affirm the ALJ’s factual findings that Rutt failed to prove facts that demonstrate that an expenditure was made. Accordingly, we hold that the unions did not make prohibited expenditures in violation of section 3(4)(a).” [184 P.3d 65 (2008), “Colorado Education Association v. Rutt,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 06SC559, Filed 2/27/12]
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court, Arguing To Limit Unions’ Communication Efforts
Eid Dissented Against The Colorado Supreme Court Decision, Arguing That Teachers’ Union Staff Political Communications Did Violate Colorado’s Ban On Unions Making Campaign Contributions And Expenditures. According to Justice Eid’s Dissent of the Colorado Supreme Court Decision in “Colorado Education Association v. Rutt,” “Justice EID, dissenting. […] By refusing to apply the membership communication exception as written to the union’s campaign activities, today’s opinion essentially finds Colorado’s segregated-funds scheme to be unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. Yet, as noted above, the United States Supreme Court has found that the federal segregated-funds scheme, upon which Colorado’s scheme is based, provides constitutionally adequate alternatives for union-sponsored campaign speech. While the majority suggests that the Colorado Constitution provides for greater free speech protection than the federal constitution, maj. op. at 77 n. 11, article XXVIII amends, and is now part of, the Colorado Constitution. I can see no reason to question the constitutionality of Colorado’s segregated-funds scheme, and thus no reason to read the membership communication exception so broadly that it swallows the prohibition on union contributions and expenditures. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.” [184 P.3d 65 (2008), “Colorado Education Association v. Rutt,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 06SC559, Filed 2/27/12]
Allison Eid On Marijuana
Eid Stood In The Way Of Cannabis Reform
2017: Eid Dissented From A Court Decision That Prevented The State From Continuing To Prosecute Minor Possession Of Marijuana
2017: The Colorado Supreme Court Affirmed That Amendment 64 Prevented The State From Continuing To Prosecute Cases With Nonfinal Convictions
2017: The Colorado Supreme Court Affirmed That Amendment 64, Legalizing Minimal Possession Of Marijuana, Prevented The State From Continuing To Prosecute Cases With Nonfinal Convictions. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “People v. Boyd,” “This case requires us to determine if Amendment 64 to the Colorado Constitution, which legalized possession of small amounts of marijuana, deprived the State of the power to continue to prosecute cases where there was a nonfinal conviction for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana and where there was a pending right to appeal (subsequently exercised by filing a timely notice of appeal) at the time the Amendment became effective. We hold that it did.” [2017 CO 2, “People v. Boyd,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 15SC752, Filed 1/17/17]
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion
Eid Dissented From The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion. According to Justice Eid’s Dissent of the Colorado Supreme Court Decision in “People v. Boyd,” “The criminal acts at issue in the cases before this court today occurred before that date, and thus were illegal at the time they were committed.[1] Because nothing in Amendment 64 suggests that it retroactively removes the People’s authority to prosecute individuals for such illegal activity, I respectfully dissent.” [2017 CO 2, “People v. Boyd,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 15SC752, Filed 1/17/17]
2015: Eid Wrote A Court Decision That Allowed A Quadriplegic Employee To Be Fired For The Use Of Licensed Medical Marijuana
2010: Dish Fired A Quadriplegic Employee Just Because Of The Use Of State-Sanctioned Medical Marijuana
2010: Dish Fired A Quadriplegic Employee For The State-Sanctioned Use Of Medical Marijuana. According to Time, “For one, Coats was a particularly sympathetic plaintiff. The 35-year-old has been quadriplegic since a car accident at age 16 and has been considered a model employee since being hired by Dish in 2007. In 2009, Coats obtained a state-issued license and began using medical marijuana at night, after work. ‘I take it at home every night,’ he said in an interview last year. ‘It helps me sleep. I wake up with less stiffness, and it quiets my spasms all through the next day.’ By sleeping off the psychoactive effects, he could report to work clear-headed the next day while the antispasmodic effects of the drug continued to calm his system. In 2010, Coats was selected for a random drug test. He came up positive for marijuana–as he told his boss he would–and was fired soon after for violating Dish’s anti-drug policy.” [Time, 6/15/15]
2015: Eid Wrote The Court’s Decision To Affirm The Termination Of The Employee
2015: The Colorado Supreme Court Upheld The Termination Of A Quadriplegic Employee For The Use Of Licensed Medical Marijuana. According to Time, “In a decision released today, the Colorado Supreme Court found that Dish Network, the national satellite TV provider, did not act illegally when it fired Brandon Coats, a Denver-area call center rep, in 2010 after Coats tested positive for marijuana. Although Colorado law permits the use of medical marijuana, the court ruled that Dish was within its rights because pot remains illegal under federal law.” [Time, 6/15/15]
Eid Wrote The Court’s Decision To Affirm The Termination Of The Employee Because Medical Marijuana Remained Unlawful Under Federal Law. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Coats v. Dish Network, LLC,” “JUSTICE EID, delivered the Opinion of the Court. […] We granted certiorari and now affirm. The term ‘lawful’ as it is used in section 24-34-402.5 is not restricted in any way, and we decline to engraft a state law limitation onto the term. Therefore, an activity such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful under federal law is not a ‘lawful’ activity under section 24-34-402.5. Accordingly, we affirm the opinion of the court of appeals.” [2015 CO 44, “Coats v. Dish Network, LLC,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 13SC394, Filed 6/15/15]
Allison Eid On The Environment
Eid Ruled To Give People Less Say In The Safety Of Their Environment
Eid Has Made It More Difficult For Coloradans To Ensure Their Health And Safety When It Comes To The Environment
The Grand Valley Citizens’ Alliance Sued To Force A Public Hearing Regarding Issuance Of A Permit To Drill. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission v. Grand Valley Citizens’ Alliance,” “Grand Valley Citizens’ Alliance, along with Cary Weldon, Ruth Weldon, Wesley Kent, Marcia Kent, and Western Colorado Congress (collectively, ‘GVC’) filed a complaint against the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission and others (the ‘Commission’) alleging that it was entitled to a hearing on an application for permit to drill (‘APD’) pursuant to section 34-60-108(7), C.R.S. (2011), of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act (the ‘Act’) and section 24-4-105, C.R.S. (2011), of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that GVC had no standing to request a hearing.” [2012 CO 52, “Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission v. Grand Valley Citizens’ Alliance,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 10SC532, Filed 6/25/12]
Eid, Writing For The Majority, Held That The Commission Properly Denied The Hearing Request, Finding That A Hearing On A Permit To Drill Was Not Mandatory. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission v. Grand Valley Citizens’ Alliance,” “Justice EID delivered the Opinion of the Court. […] We granted certiorari and now reverse. Subsection 108(7)’s reference to a hearing must be read in context with the overall statutory scheme. Subsection 108(2) requires that ‘[n]o rule, regulation, order, or amendment thereof, shall be made by the [C]ommission without a hearing….’ When read in context, subsection 108(7)’s reference to a hearing refers to the hearing required by subsection 108(2), which applies only to rules, regulations, and orders. Because GVC is challenging a permit, not a ‘rule,’ ‘regulation,’ or ‘order,’ it is not entitled to a hearing under subsection 108(7). Permits are expressly governed by section 34-60-106(1)(f), C.R.S. (2011), which gives the Commission broad authority to govern APDs and determine who can request a hearing. In this case, the Commission’s rules do not permit a citizens group like GVC to request a hearing for an APD, and instead consider their objection as a complaint. Accordingly, we hold that the Commission properly denied GVC’s request for a hearing.” [2012 CO 52, “Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission v. Grand Valley Citizens’ Alliance,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 10SC532, Filed 6/25/12]
Allison Eid On Guns
Eid Argued Against Gun Safety Regulations
Eid Argued Against Gun Safety Regulations
Eid Argued Against Local Assault Weapons Regulations
Eid As The Colorado Solicitor General Argued That State Law Trumped Denver Ordinances On Regulating Assault Weapons. According to the Denver Post, “The city of Denver can continue to regulate assault weapons and other issues because of a 3-3 deadlock in the Colorado Supreme Court today. In 2003, the state legislature passed sweeping legislation that Denver said preempted many of the city’s firearm ordinances. But two Denver district court judges – Joseph Meyer and Lawrence Manzanares – ruled that although the state legislation did override some of the more minor ordinances, Denver still had the right to regulate assault weapons, ‘Saturday night specials’ and the open carrying of firearms. The open carry law makes it unlawful to walk around visibly wearing a firearm in public. Certain individuals, with a concealed carry permit, are allowed to carry concealed weapons – but they are an exception. […] The unusual ruling came about because Allison Eid, a former Colorado Solicitor General who argued that the state laws trumped the Denver ordinances, was appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court.” [Denver Post, 6/5/06]
Eid Authored An Opinion That Struck Down A Handgun Ban
Eid Authored The Colorado Supreme Court’s Opinion Striking Down The University Of Colorado’s Handgun Ban. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado Opinion in “Regents of the University of Colorado v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus,” “The Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, LLC, along with Martha Altman, Eric Mote, and John Davis (collectively, the ‘Students’), filed a complaint against the University of Colorado’s Board of Regents (the ‘Board of Regents’ or ‘Board’) and others alleging that the Board’s Weapons Control Policy 14-I (‘the Policy’) — which prohibits the carrying of handguns on campus by all persons but certified law enforcement personnel — violates the Colorado Concealed Carry Act (‘CCA’), §§ 18-12-201 to -216, C.R.S. (2011), and the Colorado Constitution’s right to bear arms, Colo. Const. art. II, § 13. The Board of Regents filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), which the district court granted. The Students appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. […] We granted certiorari and now affirm. We hold that the CCA’s comprehensive statewide purpose, broad language, and narrow exclusions show that the General Assembly intended to divest the Board of Regents of its authority to regulate concealed handgun possession on campus. Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that, by alleging the Policy violates the CCA, the Students have stated a claim for relief. Because we affirm on statutory grounds, we do not consider the Students’ constitutional claim.” [2012 CO 17, “Regents of the University of Colorado v. Students for Concealed Carry on Campus,” The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, No. 10SC344, Filed 3/5/12]